We analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to study optimal counterterrorism and its consequences when large terrorist attacks lead to a temporary increase in terrorist recruitment. First, we show that an increase in counterterrorism makes it more likely that terrorist cells plan small rather than large attacks and therefore may increase the probability of a successful attack. Analyzing optimal counterterrorism we see that the recruitment e¤ect makes authorities increase the level of counterterrorism after large attacks. Therefore, in periods following large attacks a new attack is more likely to be small compared to other periods. Finally, we analyze the long run consequences of the recruitment e¤ect. We show that it leads to more counterterrorism, more small attacks, and a higher sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs. On the other hand, it leads to fewer large attacks and less damage.
Introduction
After a large succesful terrorist attack, is there an increased likelihood of new terrorist cells being formed? There are several good reasons to expect such a recruitment e¤ect to exist. Media attention to terrorism is higher after a large attack. Therefore the possibility of becoming a terrorist is more salient for potential terrorists. Furthermore, the increased media attention means that even relatively minor terrorist acts receive a lot of publicity. Thus, assuming that publicity is at least part of what terrorists are after, it becomes more attractive to form a terrorist cell after a large attack. Also, succesful terrorist attacks may reveal new technologies to potential terrorists.
If a signi…cant recruitment e¤ect exists then it will clearly be important for the dynamic interaction between terrorists and counterterrorism authorities. For example, when authorities decide on current counterterrorism policies they should take into account that a large succesful attack is not only harmful in itself, it also leads to an increased terrorist threat after the attack because new cells are more likely to form. Thus, even when there has been no signi…cant terrorist activity in the recent past the existence of a recruitment e¤ect will in ‡uence current counterterrorism policies. And since terrorists respond to policies their actions will also be in ‡uenced by the e¤ect, even if they do not directly take into account that their actions may in ‡uence future recruitment.
In this paper we rigorously explore the consequences of a recruitment e¤ect by formulating and analyzing a simple dynamic model of the interaction between counterterrorism authorities and a decentralized terrorist organization (or network) consisting of spontaneously formed autonomous terrorist cells. In the model, a terrorist cell lives for one period only and its only decision is whether to plan a small or a large attack. Its objective is to maximize the damage caused by its (possible) attack.
1 Planning a large attack is more risky because it requires more planning and therefore involves a higher risk of being rolled up by the authorities. The di¤erence in risk between the two types of attacks is increasing in the level of counterterrorism. Therefore, if the authorities increase the level of counterterrorism then a cell is more likely to plan a small attack. The e¤ect of an increase in counterterrorism on the probability that a cell will be succesful in making some kind of attack (small or large) is ambiguous. It can be the case that a terrorist attack becomes more likely. While a higher level of counterterrorism increases the probability of rolling up cells planning large attacks it also makes cells substitute towards small attacks which are less risky. The latter e¤ect may dominate the former.
In each period of time a terrorist cell is formed with some probability. The aim of the authorities is to minimize the expected discounted sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs over all periods by choosing the level of counterterrorism in each period.
2 The horizon is in…nite. Thus we are assuming that the terrorist organization is long-lived in the sense that new cells will continue to form in all foreseeable future. 3 We solve for optimal dynamic counterterrorism in two cases. First, we consider a benchmark case where the probability of a cell being formed is the same in all periods. Then we move on to a case where a recruitment e¤ect is in play. More speci…cally, we assume that the probability of a cell being formed is higher if there was a large attack in the previous period. We show that in this case the authorities choose a higher level of counterterrorism after a large attack. Using this result we see that in the period following a large attack a new attack is more likely to be small (and thus less likely to be large) compared to other periods. Finally, we compare the benchmark case and the recruitment case in the long run. We see that the recruitment e¤ect leads to more counterterrorism, more small attacks, and a higher sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs. On the other hand, it leads to fewer large attacks and less damage.
The model is evidently stylized. For example, it is obviously a simpli…cation to assume that terrorist cells live for one period only and that their sole objective is to maximize the expected damage from their own actions (rather than, for example, to contribute towards the promotion of some political or religious objective). However, we think that the assumptions represents a reasonable …rst approximation of the characteristics of modern decentralized terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and related regional groups (Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia, for example). Assuming that terrorists care only about in ‡icted damage …ts well with the current tendency of terrorists to simply seek to punish adversaries and cause general fear rather than engage in symbolic acts to extract speci…c concessions. 4 Empirical studies provide some support for the existence of a recruitment e¤ect of the type considered in this paper. Sandler (1999, 2000) …nd cycles in time series data for terrorist incidents. They argue that a possible explanation for such cycles is the existence of a contagion process where media coverage of succesful attacks stimulate copycat incidents. This generates an increase in terrorism which is then countered by increased counterterrorism e¤orts. These e¤orts eventually create a lull in terrorist activity which leads to decreased counterterrorism spending and then the cycle can start over again. Holden (1986) …nds that aircraft hijackings in the US was a contagious phenomenon in the years 1968-72 and that the e¤ect was stronger after succesful hijackings.
There are only a few papers studying the long term interaction between terrorists and authorities by formal modelling.
5 Jacobson and Kaplan (2007) study the dynamic interaction between a government that can make targeted killings and a terrorist organisation. Targeted killings reduce the number of succesful terrorist attacks but increase terrorist recruitment. Thus the model is complementary to ours in the sense that increased recruitment is caused by proactive counterterrorism rather than succesful terrorist attacks. The terrorists are modelled as one player who cares about the outcome in all future periods so the model is more truly dynamic than ours on the terrorist side. On the other hand, the analysis of the model relies on speci…c assumptions and numerical simulations. It is shown that if the terrorists are more patient than the authorities then there is a high stable level of violence (terrorist attacks and targeted killings). If the authorities are more patient than the terrorists then the pattern of violence is cyclic or chaotic and the overall level of violence is lower. Das (2008) analyzes di¤erent dynamic models of the interaction between a terrorist organization and a defending state. It is shown that optimal behavior can lead to terror cycles. An earlier paper on dynamic modelling and terror cycles is Faria (2003) . Rosendor¤ and Sandler (2004) consider a one period model where, as in Jacobson and Kaplan, terrorist recruitment increases with the level of proactive counterterrorism. They also assume that recruitment is higher following a succesful spectacular attack than in any other situation. This is similar to our recruitment e¤ect. So, even though this is not the focus of their paper, their analysis shed some light on the consequences of such an e¤ect. It follows from the comparative statics results that if the recruitment e¤ect is increased then terrorists become more likely to plan spectaculars. Since there is only one period, the bene…ts of increased recruitment enter directly into the utility of the terrorists. In a long term dynamic model the bene…ts of increased recruitment should be derived from its consequences, for example more attacks or a greater chance of concessions in the future. In the model presented in this paper terrorists are short sighted in the sense that they only care about the immediate consequences of their own actions (the damage in ‡icted) and thus they do not take into account the bene…ts of increased recruitment after succesful large attacks.
A detailed two period model of a terrorist organization's choice of attack technologies is studied in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010) . Recruitment is increasing in in ‡icted damage and the objective of the terrorist organization is to maximize its …nal size. The modelling of terrorists'actions is clearly more detailed than ours and important results on, for example, the e¤ect of the current size of the organization are derived. However, the strategic interaction between authorities and terrorists is not considered.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. Then, in Section 3, we consider the behavior of the terrorist cells. Optimal counterterrorism and its consequences is analyzed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the results and some ideas for further research.
The Model
In each period of time t = 0; 1; 2; ::: a terrorist cell is formed with probability t 2 (0; 1]. A cell lives for one period only and its only decision is whether to plan a small or a large attack (it can only make one attack). If the cell formed in period t succeeds in making a small attack then the damage is D > 0. If the cell succeeds in making a large attack then the damage is
where " t is drawn from a probability distribution on [0; 1) with cumulative distribution function F . The realization of " t is known to the cell when it makes its decision. We assume that F (0) = 0 and that F is di¤erentiable on [0; 1). Thus the distribution of " t can be represented by the density function f = F 0 . We assume that the density function is strictly positive, i.e., f (") > 0 for all " 0.
The authorities choose a level a 2 [0; 1) of counterterrorism in each period. The level of counterterrorism in period t, a t , determines how likely it is that a cell formed in period t is rolled up before it attacks if the cell plans a large attack. If the cell plans a small attack then the probability that it is rolled up is zero. While this is hardly realistic, it is a simple way of modelling that a cell preparing a small attack is less likely to be rolled up because a small attack requires less planning. Formally, if the cell decides to plan a large attack then the probability that it is rolled up before the attack is p(a t ), where p : [0; 1) ! [0; 1] is a di¤erentiable and strictly increasing function satisfying p(0) = 0.
6 The level of counterterrorism is known to the cell when it makes its decision. We assume that the cell maximizes expected damage. Therefore the cell plans a small attack if
and a large attack if we have the opposite inequality. If the cell is indi¤erent then we assume that it plans a small attack (this assumption is convenient for the exposition but has absolutely no in ‡uence on the results).
The aim of the authorities is to minimize the expected discounted sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs over all periods by choosing the level of counterterrorism in each period. The discounting rate of the authorities is 2 (0; 1). The cost of counterterrorism is given by a di¤erentiable and strictly increasing function c : [0; 1) ! [0; 1) with c(0) = 0.
The timing of events and decisions in period t is described in the list below. It is important to note that when the authorities decide on the level of counterterrorism they know t and F but they do not know whether a cell will be formed and what the realized value of " t will be in that case. r t denotes the realized damage from terrorism in period t.
Timing of decisions and events in period t:
1. The authorities decide on a t and pay the cost c(a t );
2. A new cell is formed with probability t ;
3. If a cell was formed then the value of " t is realized and the cell decides what kind of attack to plan;
4. If a cell was formed and planned a small attack then it launches its attack (realized damage: r t = D);
5. If a cell was formed and planned a large attack then it is rolled up with probability p(a t ) (realized damage: r t = 0); 6 We could have assumed that the probability of a cell planning a small attack is p s (a t ) < p(a t ), where p s is a function satisfying the same conditions as p. However, as long as the di¤erence in risk between the two types of attack, p(a t ) p s (a t ), is increasing in a t (i.e., p 0 (a t ) p 0 s (a t ) > 0) this would not qualitatively change the behavior of the terrorist cells.
6. If a cell was formed, planned a large attack, and was not rolled up then it launches its attack (realized damage: r t = D(1 + " t )).
The Behavior of the Terrorist Cells
Suppose that in some period t the authorities choose the level of counterterrorism a (we suppress subscript t's). Furthermore suppose that a cell is formed. As noted above the cell plans a small attack if and only if
Thus the probability that the cell launches a small attack is
where
:
Thus we see that an increase in the level of counterterrorism makes it more likely that the cell will launch a small attack. The probability of the cell succesfully launching a large attack is
Since p 0 > 0 and
> 0 this expression is decreasing in a, so an increase in a makes a large attack less likely. Adding the two probabilities above we get the probability that the cell is succesful in launching some kind of attack (which is obviously equal to the probability that it is not rolled up):
We see that
The …rst term arises from a's e¤ect on the probability of the cell being rolled up. This term is obviously negative. The second term arises from a's e¤ect on the cell's decision about what kind of attack to plan. An increase in a makes it more likely that the cell will plan a small attack which decreases the probability that it is rolled up. Thus this term is positive. Generally we cannot say which of the two e¤ects that dominates, it depends on the functions p and F and the value of a. Below we show by an example that an increase in the level of counterterrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Consider the following simple example:
F (") = 1 exp( "):
Thus the probability that the cell is succesful in making an attack is
and hence we have
For low levels of a an increase in the level of counterterrorism makes a terrorist attack less likely and for high levels of a we have the opposite e¤ect. More precisely,
@P @a
is negative for a's below the positive root of a(1 + a) 1 and positive for a's above this root.
Optimal Counterterrorism
In this section we consider the problem of the authorities. First, we consider our benchmark case where, for each t, the probability of a cell being born in period t ( t ) does not depend on what has happened in earlier periods. In this case the authorities'problem is simply a sequence of independent static problems which are easy to solve. Then we introduce a recruitment e¤ect which makes the authorities' problem truly dynamic. We solve this problem by dynamic programming. Finally, we compare the two cases. All proofs that are not in the text can be found in the appendix.
The Benchmark Case
In this case the level of counterterrorism chosen in some period t does not in ‡uence the problem of the authorities in future periods. Therefore, in each period the authorities simply choose the level of counterterrorism that minimizes the sum of the expected damage in ‡icted by the cell possibly formed in this period and the cost of counterterrorism.
Consider the authorities'problem in period t. For simplicity we suppress subscript t's such that we write , a and " instead of t , a t and " t . The expected damage from a cell formed in period t is
Note that
We can write the problem of the authorities as
Since p, c, and F are di¤erentiable so is . The …rst order condition for an interior solution is 0 (a) = 0; which can also be written
This is a simple marginal cost equals marginal bene…t equation. The left hand side is of course the marginal cost of counterterrorism. The right hand side is minus the marginal e¤ect of counterterrorism on the expected terrorism damage.
By di¤erentiating and collecting terms (see the appendix for details) we see that the condition can be written
Note that, marginally, there is only a direct e¤ect of a on the expected damage: Increasing the level of terrorism means that there is a higher probability of rolling up a terrorist cell. The indirect e¤ects that arise from " 's dependence on a sum to zero. Thus, when solving the …rst order condition the authorities need only consider the direct e¤ect of counterterrorism. Under some additional assumptions on the functions p and c it follows by standard arguments (see the appendix for details) that the solution to the authorities problem is unique, interior, and the only solution to the …rst order condition.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness: Benchmark Case) Suppose p and c are twice di¤erentiable and that we have the following conditions: Then there is a unique solution to the authorities'problem. The solution is interior and the only solution to the …rst order condition.
Let a denote the unique optimal level of counterterrorism. a obviously depends on and thus the behavior of terrorist cells at the optimum also depends on . In the following proposition we explore the e¤ects of on the outcome of the interaction between the terrorists and the authorities.
Proposition 2 (E¤ects of a Change in )
Suppose the assumptions from Proposition 1 are satis…ed. Then the following statements hold at the optimum:
1. The level of counterterrorism, a, is increasing in ; 2. The probability of a small attack, F (" ( a)), is increasing in ; 3. The sum of expected damage and counterterrorism costs, ( a) + c( a), is increasing in ; 4. The probability of a small attack conditional on the event that there is some kind of attack, F (" ( a)) 1 p( a) (1 F (" ( a))) ;
is increasing in .
Proof. By the …rst order condition it easily follows that a is increasing in . And then the second and third statement follows from the observations that F (" ) and (a) + c(a) are increasing in a and . To establish the last statement, …rst note that the probability of a small attack conditional on the event that there is some kind of attack is
By di¤erentiation it follows that this probability is increasing in a (remember that " is a function of a). Therefore, when the authorities behave optimally the probability is increasing in .
The …rst three statements of the proposition are not surprising. The …nal statement is more interesting. It basically says that when terrorist cells are more likely to form then actual attacks are more likely to be small and thus less likely to be large. However, note that it is not necessarily the case that the probability of a large attack, (1 F (" ( a)))(1 p( a)), decreases with . The increased probability of a cell being formed may outweigh the e¤ects of increased counterterrorism. So we only have an unambiguous e¤ect on the probability of a large attack when we condition on an attack taking place. Finally, it is also worth noting that we cannot generally say in which direction the probability of some kind of attack and the expected damage changes when increases.
The Recruitment Case
Now we introduce a recruitment e¤ect. More speci…cally, we assume that t is higher if there was a large terrorist attack in period t 1 than if there was not. To model the recruitment e¤ect de…ne the state variable x at time t as
So x t = s (for small) if the damage from terrrorism was at most D in period t 1. If the damage was higher than D in period t 1 then x t = l (for large). We then let t depend on x t and assume that
We furthermore assume that t (s) and t (l) does not explicitly depend on t. Thus we can write
It is obvious that the level of counterterrorism chosen in period t in ‡uences the probability that a cell is born in period t + 1 because it in ‡uences r t (the realized terrorism damage in period t) and thus x t+1 . Therefore the authorities must solve a truly dynamic problem in order to …nd their optimal level of counterterrorism in each period. We solve the problem by dynamic programming (see, e.g., Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989) .
The Bellman equation for the dynamic programming problem can be written
where (a; x) = x (a) + c(a) and P (x 0 ; x; a) = Pr(x t+1 = x 0 jx t = x; a t = a) for all x; x 0 2 fs; lg:
Writing the transition probabilities in detail we get
By plugging in the transition probabilities the Bellman equation can be written
Lemma 3 There exists a unique solution V to the Bellman equation above. It satis…es V (s) < V (l). [ (a; x) + (P (s; x; a) V (s) + P (l; x; a) V (l))]:
Pairs of solutions to these two minimization problems are solutions to the dynamic programming problem of the authorities. In the proposition below we present an existence and uniqueness result. For simplicity we de…ne g(a; x) = (a; x) + (P (s; x; a) V (s) + P (l; x; a) V (l)):
Proposition 4 (Existence and Uniqueness: Recruitment Case) Suppose the assumptions from Proposition 1 are satis…ed. Furthermore, suppose that F is twice di¤erentiable and that
Then, for each x 2 fs; lg, there is a unique solution to the problem considered above. The solution is interior and the only solution to the …rst order condition @ @a g(a; x) = 0:
Furthermore, letting a x rec ("rec" for recruitment) denote the optimal level of terrorism in state x we have a s rec < a l rec :
In words, the …nal assumption of the proposition ( @ 2 @a 2 F (" ) 0) means that the second derivative of the probability that a cell, if formed, plans a small attack is non-positive. I.e., while an increase in a always makes it more likely that a cell plans a small attack we assume that the size of this e¤ect does not increase with
it follows that su¢ cient conditions for this assumption to hold are
The …rst of these conditions means that the marginal e¤ect of increased counterterrorism on the value of " for which cells shift from planning a small to planning a large attack is non-increasing in the level of counterterrorism. 7 The second condition means that, loosely speaking, the probability of a cell with "striking capability" " being formed is non-increasing in ".
We saw that the level of counterterrorism is always higher when there was a large attack in the previous period than when there was not. Using this result we can show that other interesting variables also depend systematically on the state. The results are collected in the proposition below. Note that we cannot make general statements about how the probability of a large attack, the probability of some kind of attack, and the expected damage depend on the state.
Proposition 5 (Comparing the States)
Suppose the conditions from Proposition 4 are satis…ed. Then the following statements hold at the optimum:
1. The probability of a small attack is higher in state l than in state s;
2. The sum of expected terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs is higher in state l than in state s;
3. The probability of a small attack conditional on the event that there is some kind of attack is higher in state l than in state s.
Proof. The three variables are increasing in a and increasing in or independent of (see the proof of Proposition 2). Therefore the conclusions follow immediately from the result that a s rec < a l rec .
As was the case when we considered the e¤ect of an increase in in the benchmark case, the …nal statement is the least obvious. From this statement it follows that the distribution of actual attacks puts less probability mass on large attacks if there was a large attack in the previous period than if there was not. This is an interesting prediction.
Finally, we consider the long run (steady state) distribution of x when the authorities behave optimally. De…ne Q(x 0 ; x) = P (x 0 ; x; a x rec ) for all x 0 ; x 2 fs; lg:
I.e., Q(x 0 ; x) is the probability of being in state x 0 in period t + 1 when we are in state x in period t and the authorities are behaving optimally. Given these 7 This conditions can be expressed in terms of p by p 00
transition probabilities the long run distribution of the state, which we denote , can then be found by solving the equation
Thus we get
Of course then determines the long run distribution of the level of counterterrorism and all functions thereof. We will use this when we compare the two cases in the long run.
Comparing the Two Cases
First, consider the authorities' problem with and without the recruitment e¤ect in some period t. Suppose that = xt , i.e., that the probability of a new cell being formed is the same whether or not there is a recruitment e¤ect. Then the following proposition shows that the authorities will choose a strictly higher level of counterterrorism if the recruitment e¤ect is present. We assume that the conditions for existence and uniqueness are satis…ed. The intuition behind the result is simple. When there is a recruitment e¤ect the authorities do not only consider the sum of expected damage and costs in the current period. They also take into account that raising the counterterrorism level decreases the probability of a large attack in the current period and therefore makes it less likely that a cell will be formed in the following period. Thus the marginal bene…t from counterterrorism is higher when there is a recruitment e¤ect and therefore a higher level is chosen in this case.
From the proposition it follows easily that if we are in a period with = xt then the probability of a small attack is highest in the recruitment case. On the other hand, the probability of a large attack is lowest in the recruitment case. This is also true for the expected terrorism damage but the sum of expected damage and counterterrorism costs is highest in the recruitment case.
Ultimately we want to compare long run distributions for the two cases. The problem with this is how to choose the parameters , s and l in order to get meaningful comparisons. We do it the following way. Fix s and l and suppose that in each period the probability of a cell being formed in the benchmark case is = s with probability (s) l with probability (l) ;
where is the long run distribution of x in the recruitment case. In each period the realization of is known to the authorities when they choose the level of counterterrorism. We de…ne this way to ensure that the long run distributions of the probability of a cell being formed are the same in the benchmark and the recruitment case. Thus any di¤erence between the two cases does not arise simply because more cells are formed in the recruitment case.
As is standard we say that a variable (e.g., the level of counterterrorism or the expected terrorism damage) is higher in the long run in the recruitment case if the long run distribution of the variable in this case strictly …rst order stochastically dominates the long run distribution in the benchmark case (and vice versa). Here this is equivalent to saying that if we compare periods in the recruitment case where the state is x to periods in the benchmark case where = x then the variable is higher in the recruitment case. Therefore we immediately get the results in the proposition below from Proposition 6 and the dependence of the variables on the level of counterterrorism (no proof is provided). Note that we cannot generally say whether the long run probability of some kind of attack is highest in the recruitment or the benchmark case.
2. The probability of a small attack (r = D) is highest in the recruitment case; 3. The probability of a large attack (r > D) is highest in the benchmark case; 4. The expected terrorism damage is highest in the benchmark case;
5. The sum of expected terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs is highest in the recruitment case.
Discussion
Analyzing the behavior of terrorist cells we saw that an increase in the level of counterterrorism makes some cells substitute from planning a large to planning a small attack. This substitution e¤ect may dominate the direct e¤ect that an increase in counterterrorism makes it more likely that cells planning large attacks are rolled up by the authorities. Therefore a higher level of counterterrorism may increase the risk of a terrorist attack. This is a simple but important observation that follows from our model. By analyzing the problem of optimal dynamic counterterrorism we saw that the existence of a recruitment e¤ect makes authorities increase the level of counterterrorism after a large attack. This implies that in periods following a large attack there is a higher probability of a small attack compared to other periods. Because of the increased likelihood of a cell being formed it is not necessarily the case that there is a lower probability of a large attack. However, the probability of a large attack conditional on some kind of attack taking place is lower in periods following a large attack. So the e¤ect of a large attack on the size of an attack in the following period is unambiguous, a new attack is more likely to be small and less likely to be large.
Our comparison of the benchmark and the recruitment case revealed that they systematically di¤er with respect to the long run distribution of several variables. In the recruitment case there is more counterterrorism, more small attacks, and a higher sum of terrorism damage and counterterrorism costs. On the other hand, there are fewer large attacks and less damage. Note that even though the recruitment e¤ect leads to less terrorism damage the authorities would prefer such an e¤ect not to exist because it leads to a higher sum of damage and costs.
While the analysis of our simple model provides a number of interesting insights there is clearly room for further theoretical work on the consequences of the recruitment e¤ect. The way we de…ne the recruitment e¤ect is evidently stylized. It is hardly realistic that there is no recruitment e¤ect for attacks resulting in damage below a certain threshold ("small attacks") and that the recruitment e¤ect is constant for attacks with damage above this threshold ("large attacks"). We think that our assumption serves as a reasonable …rst approximation but it would be interesting to explore models with a more realistic recruitment e¤ect.
In our model the recruitment e¤ect is completely exogenous. As we mentioned in the introduction there are good reasons for assuming that a recruitment e¤ect exists. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to have a model where it arises endogenously from the interaction between terrorists and authorities (and perhaps other players such as the public and the media). A rigorous theoretical investigation into the causes of recruitment e¤ects could provide us with valuable information on, for example, the conditions under which they are signi…cant and what can be done to mitigate them.
Finally, to get a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities we made a number of simplistic assumptions about the terrorists and their behavior. For example, we assumed that each cell cares only about the damage caused by its own possible attack. Since, by de…nition, terrorists have some ultimate goal it is clearly not a perfect representation of their preferences to assume that they care only about in ‡icted damage. However, we think it is a reasonable approximation, especially when the goal is long term and perhaps di¤use.
